The Project Gutenberg eBook of Crito, by Plato

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CRITO

BY

PLATO

TRANSLATED BY BENJAMIN JOWETT

INTRODUCTION

The Critoseems intended to exhibit the character of Socrates in one lightonly, not as the philosopher, fulfilling a divine mission and trusting inthe will of heaven, but simply as the good citizen, who having beenunjustly condemned is willing to give up his life in obedience to the lawsof the state . . .

The days of Socrates are drawing to a close; the fatal ship has been seenoff Sunium, as he is informed by his aged friend and contemporary Crito,who visits him before the dawn has broken; he himself has been warned in adream that on the third day he must depart. Time is precious, and Critohas come early in order to gain his consent to a plan of escape. This canbe easily accomplished by his friends, who will incur no danger in makingthe attempt to save him, but will be disgraced for ever if they allow himto perish. He should think of his duty to his children, and not play intothe hands of his enemies. Money is already provided by Crito as well as bySimmias and others, and he will have no difficulty in finding friends inThessaly and other places.

Socrates is afraid that Crito is but pressing upon him the opinions of themany; whereas, all his life long he has followed the dictates of reasononly and the opinion of the one wise or skilled man. There was a time whenCrito himself had allowed the propriety of this. And although someonewill say ‘the many can kill us,’ that makes no difference; but a good life,in other words, a just and honourable life, is alone to be valued. Allconsiderations of loss of reputation or injury to his children should bedismissed: the only question is whether he would be right in attempting toescape. Crito, who is a disinterested person not having the fear of deathbefore his eyes, shall answer this for him. Before he was condemned theyhad often held discussions, in which they agreed that no man should eitherdo evil, or return evil for evil, or betray the right. Are theseprinciples to be altered because the circumstances of Socrates are altered?Crito admits that they remain the same. Then is his escape consistent withthe maintenance of them? To this Crito is unable or unwilling to reply.

Socrates proceeds:—Suppose the Laws of Athens to come and remonstrate withhim: they will ask, ‘Why does he seek to overturn them?’ and if he replies,‘They have injured him,’ will not the Laws answer, ‘Yes, but was that theagreement? Has he any objection to make to them which would justify him inoverturning them? Was he not brought into the world and educated by theirhelp, and are they not his parents? He might have left Athens and gonewhere he pleased, but he has lived there for seventy years more constantlythan any other citizen.’ Thus he has clearly shown that he acknowledgedthe agreement, which he cannot now break without dishonour to himself anddanger to his friends. Even in the course of the trial he might haveproposed exile as the penalty, but then he declared that he preferred deathto exile. And whither will he direct his footsteps? In any well-orderedstate the Laws will consider him as an enemy. Possibly in a land ofmisrule like Thessaly he may be welcomed at first, and the unseemlynarrative of his escape will be regarded by the inhabitants as an amusingtale. But if he offends them he will have to learn another sort of lesson.Will he continue to give lectures in virtue? That would hardly be decent.And how will his children be the gainers if he takes them into Thessaly,and deprives them of Athenian citizenship? Or if he leaves them behind,does he expect that they will be better taken care of by his friendsbecause he is in Thessaly? Will not true friends care for them equallywhether he is alive or dead?

Finally, they exhort him to think of justice first, and of life andchildren afterwards. He may now depart in peace and innocence, a suffererand not a doer of evil. But if he breaks agreements, and returns evil forevil, they will be angry with him while he lives; and their brethren theLaws of the world below will receive him as an enemy. Such is the mysticvoice which is always murmuring in his ears.

That Socrates was not a good citizen was a charge made against him duringhis lifetime, which has been often repeated in later ages. The crimes ofAlcibiades, Critias, and Charmides, who had been his pupils, were stillrecent in the memory of the now restored democracy. The fact that he hadbeen neutral in the death-struggle of Athens was not likely to conciliatepopular good-will. Plato, writing probably in the next generation,undertakes the defence of his friend and master in this particular, not tothe Athenians of his day, but to posterity and the world at large.

Whether such an incident ever really occurred as the visit of Crito and theproposal of escape is uncertain; Plato could easily have invented far morethan that; ¹and in the selection of Crito, the aged friend, as thefittest person to make the proposal to Socrates, we seem to recognize thehand of the artist. Whether anyone who has been subjected by the laws ofhis country to an unjust judgment is right in attempting to escape, is athesis about which casuists might disagree. Shelley ²is ofopinion that Socrates ‘did well to die,’ but not for the ‘sophistical’reasons which Plato has put into his mouth. And there would be nodifficulty in arguing that Socrates should have lived and preferred to aglorious death the good which he might still be able to perform. ‘Arhetorician would have had much to say upon that point.’ It may beobserved however that Plato never intended to answer the question ofcasuistry, but only to exhibit the ideal of patient virtue which refuses todo the least evil in order to avoid the greatest, and to show his mastermaintaining in death the opinions which he had professed in his life. Not‘the world,’ but the ‘one wise man,’ is still the paradox of Socrates inhis last hours. He must be guided by reason, although her conclusions maybe fatal to him. The remarkable sentiment that the wicked can do neithergood nor evil is true, if taken in the sense, which he means, of moralevil; in his own words, ‘they cannot make a man wise or foolish.’

This little dialogue is a perfect piece of dialectic, in which granting the‘common principle,’ there is no escaping from the conclusion. It isanticipated at the beginning by the dream of Socrates and the parody ofHomer. The personification of the Laws, and of their brethren the Laws inthe world below, is one of the noblest and boldest figures of speech whichoccur in Plato.

CRITO

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE:
Socrates, Crito.

SCENE: The Prison of Socrates.

SOCRATES: Why have you come at this hour, Crito? it must be quite early?

CRITO: Yes, certainly.

SOCRATES: What is the exact time?

CRITO: The dawn is breaking.

SOCRATES: I wonder that the keeper of the prison would let you in.

CRITO: He knows me, because I often come, Socrates; moreover, I have donehim a kindness.

SOCRATES: And are you only just arrived?

CRITO: No, I came some time ago.

SOCRATES: Then why did you sit and say nothing, instead of at onceawakening me?

CRITO: I should not have liked myself, Socrates, to be in such greattrouble and unrest as you are—indeed I should not: I have been watchingwith amazement your peaceful slumbers; and for that reason I did not awakeyou, because I wished to minimize the pain. I have always thought you tobe of a happy disposition; but never did I see anything like the easy,tranquil manner in which you bear this calamity.

SOCRATES: Why, Crito, when a man has reached my age he ought not to berepining at the approach of death.

CRITO: And yet other old men find themselves in similar misfortunes, andage does not prevent them from repining.

SOCRATES: That is true. But you have not told me why you come at thisearly hour.

CRITO: I come to bring you a message which is sad and painful; not, as Ibelieve, to yourself, but to all of us who are your friends, and saddest ofall to me.

SOCRATES: What? Has the ship come from Delos, on the arrival of which Iam to die?

CRITO: No, the ship has not actually arrived, but she will probably behere to-day, as persons who have come from Sunium tell me that they haveleft her there; and therefore to-morrow, Socrates, will be the last day ofyour life.

SOCRATES: Very well, Crito; if such is the will of God, I am willing; butmy belief is that there will be a delay of a day.

CRITO: Why do you think so?

SOCRATES: I will tell you. I am to die on the day after the arrival ofthe ship?

CRITO: Yes; that is what the authorities say.

SOCRATES: But I do not think that the ship will be here until to-morrow;this I infer from a vision which I had last night, or rather only just now,when you fortunately allowed me to sleep.

CRITO: And what was the nature of the vision?

SOCRATES: There appeared to me the likeness of a woman, fair and comely,clothed in bright raiment, who called to me and said: O Socrates,

CRITO: What a singular dream, Socrates!

SOCRATES: There can be no doubt about the meaning, Crito, I think.

CRITO: Yes; the meaning is only too clear. But, oh! my beloved Socrates,let me entreat you once more to take my advice and escape. For if you dieI shall not only lose a friend who can never be replaced, but there isanother evil: people who do not know you and me will believe that I mighthave saved you if I had been willing to give money, but that I did notcare. Now, can there be a worse disgrace than this—that I should bethought to value money more than the life of a friend? For the many willnot be persuaded that I wanted you to escape, and that you refused.

SOCRATES: But why, my dear Crito, should we care about the opinion of themany? Good men, and they are the only persons who are worth considering,will think of these things truly as they occurred.

CRITO: But you see, Socrates, that the opinion of the many must beregarded, for what is now happening shows that they can do the greatestevil to anyone who has lost their good opinion.

SOCRATES: I only wish it were so, Crito; and that the many could do thegreatest evil; for then they would also be able to do the greatest good—andwhat a fine thing this would be! But in reality they can do neither;for they cannot make a man either wise or foolish; and whatever they do isthe result of chance.

CRITO: Well, I will not dispute with you; but please to tell me, Socrates,whether you are not acting out of regard to me and your other friends: areyou not afraid that if you escape from prison we may get into trouble withthe informers for having stolen you away, and lose either the whole or agreat part of our property; or that even a worse evil may happen to us?Now, if you fear on our account, be at ease; for in order to save you, weought surely to run this, or even a greater risk; be persuaded, then, anddo as I say.

SOCRATES: Yes, Crito, that is one fear which you mention, but by no meansthe only one.

CRITO: Fear not—there are persons who are willing to get you out ofprison at no great cost; and as for the informers, they are far from beingexorbitant in their demands—a little money will satisfy them. My means,which are certainly ample, are at your service, and if you have a scrupleabout spending all mine, here are strangers who will give you the use oftheirs; and one of them, Simmias the Theban, has brought a large sum ofmoney for this very purpose; and Cebes and many others are prepared tospend their money in helping you to escape. I say, therefore, do nothesitate on our account, and do not say, as you did in the court ⁴that you will have a difficulty in knowing what to do with yourselfanywhere else. For men will love you in other places to which you may go,and not in Athens only; there are friends of mine in Thessaly, if you liketo go to them, who will value and protect you, and no Thessalian will giveyou any trouble. Nor can I think that you are at all justified, Socrates,in betraying your own life when you might be saved; in acting thus you areplaying into the hands of your enemies, who are hurrying on yourdestruction. And further I should say that you are deserting your ownchildren; for you might bring them up and educate them; instead of whichyou go away and leave them, and they will have to take their chance; and ifthey do not meet with the usual fate of orphans, there will be small thanksto you. No man should bring children into the world who is unwilling topersevere to the end in their nurture and education. But you appear to bechoosing the easier part, not the better and manlier, which would have beenmore becoming in one who professes to care for virtue in all his actions,like yourself. And indeed, I am ashamed not only of you, but of us who areyour friends, when I reflect that the whole business will be attributedentirely to our want of courage. The trial need never have come on, ormight have been managed differently; and this last act, or crowning folly,will seem to have occurred through our negligence and cowardice, who mighthave saved you, if we had been good for anything; and you might have savedyourself, for there was no difficulty at all. See now, Socrates, how sadand discreditable are the consequences, both to us and you. Make up yourmind then, or rather have your mind already made up, for the time ofdeliberation is over, and there is only one thing to be done, which must bedone this very night, and, if we delay at all, will be no longer practicableor possible; I beseech you therefore, Socrates, be persuaded by me, and doas I say.

SOCRATES: Dear Crito, your zeal is invaluable, if a right one; but ifwrong, the greater the zeal the greater the danger; and therefore we oughtto consider whether I shall or shall not do as you say. For I am andalways have been one of those natures who must be guided by reason,whatever the reason may be which upon reflection appears to me to be thebest; and now that this chance has befallen me, I cannot repudiate my ownwords: the principles which I have hitherto honoured and revered I stillhonour, and unless we can at once find other and better principles, I amcertain not to agree with you; no, not even if the power of the multitudecould inflict many more imprisonments, confiscations, deaths, frighteningus like children with hobgoblin terrors. ⁵What will be thefairest way of considering the question? Shall I return to your oldargument about the opinions of men?—we were saying that some of them areto be regarded, and others not. Now were we right in maintaining thisbefore I was condemned? And has the argument which was once good nowproved to be talk for the sake of talking—mere childish nonsense? That iswhat I want to consider with your help, Crito:—whether, under my presentcircumstances, the argument appears to be in any way different or not; andis to be allowed by me or disallowed. That argument, which, as I believe,is maintained by many persons of authority, was to the effect, as I wassaying, that the opinions of some men are to be regarded, and of other mennot to be regarded. Now you, Crito, are not going to die to-morrow—atleast, there is no human probability of this—and therefore you aredisinterested and not liable to be deceived by the circumstances in whichyou are placed. Tell me then, whether I am right in saying that someopinions, and the opinions of some men only, are to be valued, and thatother opinions, and the opinions of other men, are not to be valued. I askyou whether I was right in maintaining this?

CRITO: Certainly.

SOCRATES: The good are to be regarded, and not the bad?

CRITO: Yes.

SOCRATES: And the opinions of the wise are good, and the opinions of theunwise are evil?

CRITO: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And what was said about another matter? Is the pupil whodevotes himself to the practice of gymnastics supposed to attend to thepraise and blame and opinion of every man, or of one man only—hisphysician or trainer, whoever he may be?

CRITO: Of one man only.

SOCRATES: And he ought to fear the censure and welcome the praise of thatone only, and not of the many?

CRITO: Clearly so.

SOCRATES: And he ought to act and train, and eat and drink in the waywhich seems good to his single master who has understanding, rather thanaccording to the opinion of all other men put together?

CRITO: True.

SOCRATES: And if he disobeys and disregards the opinion and approval ofthe one, and regards the opinion of the many who have no understanding,will he not suffer evil?

CRITO: Certainly he will.

SOCRATES: And what will the evil be, whither tending and what affecting,in the disobedient person?

CRITO: Clearly, affecting the body; that is what is destroyed by the evil.

SOCRATES: Very good; and is not this true, Crito, of other things which weneed not separately enumerate? In questions of just and unjust, fair andfoul, good and evil, which are the subjects of our present consultation,ought we to follow the opinion of the many and to fear them; or the opinionof the one man who has understanding? ought we not to fear and reverencehim more than all the rest of the world: and if we desert him shall we notdestroy and injure that principle in us which may be assumed to be improvedby justice and deteriorated by injustice—there is such a principle?

CRITO: Certainly there is, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Take a parallel instance:—if, acting under the advice of thosewho have no understanding, we destroy that which is improved by health andis deteriorated by disease, would life be worth having? And that which hasbeen destroyed is—the body?

CRITO: Yes.

SOCRATES: Could we live, having an evil and corrupted body?

CRITO: Certainly not.

SOCRATES: And will life be worth having, if that higher part of man bedestroyed, which is improved by justice and depraved by injustice? Do wesuppose that principle, whatever it may be in man, which has to do withjustice and injustice, to be inferior to the body?

CRITO: Certainly not.

SOCRATES: More honourable than the body?

CRITO: Far more.

SOCRATES: Then, my friend, we must not regard what the many say of us;but what he, the one man who has understanding of just and unjust, willsay, and what the truth will say. And therefore you begin in error whenyou advise that we should regard the opinion of the many about just andunjust, good and evil, honourable and dishonourable.—‘Well,’ someone willsay, ‘but the many can kill us.’

CRITO: Yes, Socrates; that will clearly be the answer.

SOCRATES: And it is true; but still I find with surprise that the oldargument is unshaken as ever. And I should like to know whether I may saythe same of another proposition—that not life, but a good life, is to bechiefly valued?

CRITO: Yes, that also remains unshaken.

SOCRATES: And a good life is equivalent to a just and honourable one—thatholds also?

CRITO: Yes, it does.

SOCRATES: From these premises I proceed to argue the question whether Iought or ought not to try and escape without the consent of the Athenians:and if I am clearly right in escaping, then I will make the attempt; but ifnot, I will abstain. The other considerations which you mention, of moneyand loss of character and the duty of educating one’s children, are, Ifear, only the doctrines of the multitude, who would be as ready to restorepeople to life, if they were able, as they are to put them to death—andwith as little reason. But now, since the argument has thus far prevailed,the only question which remains to be considered is whether we shall dorightly either in escaping or in suffering others to aid in our escape andpaying them in money and thanks, or whether in reality we shall not dorightly; and if the latter, then death or any other calamity which mayensue on my remaining here must not be allowed to enter into thecalculation.

CRITO: I think that you are right, Socrates; how then shall we proceed?

SOCRATES: Let us consider the matter together, and do you either refute meif you can, and I will be convinced; or else cease, my dear friend, fromrepeating to me that I ought to escape against the wishes of the Athenians:for I highly value your attempts to persuade me to do so, but I may not bepersuaded against my own better judgment. And now please to consider myfirst position, and try how you can best answer me.

CRITO: I will.

SOCRATES: Are we to say that we are never intentionally to do wrong, orthat in one way we ought and in another way we ought not to do wrong, or isdoing wrong always evil and dishonourable, as I was just now saying, and ashas been already acknowledged by us? Are all our former admissions whichwere made within a few days to be thrown away? And have we, at our age,been earnestly discoursing with one another all our life long only todiscover that we are no better than children? Or, in spite of the opinionof the many, and in spite of consequences whether better or worse, shall weinsist on the truth of what was then said, that injustice is always an eviland dishonour to him who acts unjustly? Shall we say so or not?

CRITO: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then we must do no wrong?

CRITO: Certainly not.

SOCRATES: Nor, when injured, injure in return, as the many imagine; for wemust injure no one at all? ⁶

CRITO: Clearly not.

SOCRATES: Again, Crito, may we do evil?

CRITO: Surely not, Socrates.

SOCRATES: And what of doing evil in return for evil, which is the moralityof the many—is that just or not?

CRITO: Not just.

SOCRATES: For doing evil to another is the same as injuring him?

CRITO: Very true.

SOCRATES: Then we ought not to retaliate or render evil for evil toanyone, whatever evil we may have suffered from him. But I would have youconsider, Crito, whether you really mean what you are saying. For thisopinion has never been held, and never will be held, by any considerablenumber of persons; and those who are agreed and those who are not agreedupon this point have no common ground, and can only despise one anotherwhen they see how widely they differ. Tell me, then, whether you agreewith and assent to my first principle, that neither injury nor retaliationnor warding off evil by evil is ever right. And shall that be the premiseof our argument? Or do you decline and dissent from this? For so I haveever thought, and continue to think; but, if you are of another opinion,let me hear what you have to say. If, however, you remain of the same mindas formerly, I will proceed to the next step.

CRITO: You may proceed, for I have not changed my mind.

SOCRATES: Then I will go on to the next point, which may be put in theform of a question:—Ought a man to do what he admits to be right, or oughthe to betray the right?

CRITO: He ought to do what he thinks right.

SOCRATES: But if this is true, what is the application? In leaving theprison against the will of the Athenians, do I wrong any? or rather do Inot wrong those whom I ought least to wrong? Do I not desert theprinciples which were acknowledged by us to be just—what do you say?

CRITO: I cannot tell, Socrates; for I do not know.

SOCRATES: Then consider the matter in this way:—Imagine that I am aboutto play truant (you may call the proceeding by any name which you like),and the laws and the government come and interrogate me: ‘Tell us,Socrates,’ they say; ‘what are you about? are you not going by an act ofyours to overturn us—the laws, and the whole state, as far as in you lies?Do you imagine that a state can subsist and not be overthrown, in which thedecisions of law have no power, but are set aside and trampled upon byindividuals?’ What will be our answer, Crito, to these and the like words?Anyone, and especially a rhetorician, will have a good deal to say onbehalf of the law which requires a sentence to be carried out. He willargue that this law should not be set aside; and shall we reply, ‘Yes; butthe state has injured us and given an unjust sentence.’ Suppose I saythat?

CRITO: Very good, Socrates.

SOCRATES: ‘And was that our agreement with you?’ the law would answer; ‘orwere you to abide by the sentence of the state?’ And if I were to expressmy astonishment at their words, the law would probably add: ‘Answer,Socrates, instead of opening your eyes—you are in the habit of asking andanswering questions. Tell us,—What complaint have you to make against uswhich justifies you in attempting to destroy us and the state? In thefirst place did we not bring you into existence? Your father married yourmother by our aid and begat you. Say whether you have any objection tourge against those of us who regulate marriage?’ None, I should reply.‘Or against those of us who after birth regulate the nurture and educationof children, in which you also were trained? Were not the laws, which havethe charge of education, right in commanding your father to train you inmusic and gymnastic?’ Right, I should reply. ‘Well then, since you werebrought into the world and nurtured and educated by us, can you deny in thefirst place that you are our child and slave, as your fathers were beforeyou? And if this is true you are not on equal terms with us; nor can youthink that you have a right to do to us what we are doing to you. Wouldyou have any right to strike or revile or do any other evil to your fatheror your master, if you had one, because you have been struck or reviled byhim, or received some other evil at his hands? You would not say this.And because we think right to destroy you, do you think that you have anyright to destroy us in return, and your country as far as in you lies?Will you, O professor of true virtue, pretend that you are justified inthis? Has a philosopher like you failed to discover that our country ismore to be valued and higher and holier far than mother or father or anyancestor, and more to be regarded in the eyes of the gods and of men ofunderstanding? also to be soothed, and gently and reverently entreated whenangry, even more than a father, and either to be persuaded, or if notpersuaded, to be obeyed? And when we are punished by her, whether withimprisonment or stripes, the punishment is to be endured in silence; and ifshe lead us to wounds or death in battle, thither we follow as is right;neither may anyone yield or retreat or leave his rank, but whether inbattle or in a court of law, or in any other place, he must do what hiscity and his country order him; or he must change their view of what isjust: and if he may do no violence to his father or mother, much less mayhe do violence to his country.’ What answer shall we make to this, Crito?Do the laws speak truly, or do they not?

CRITO: I think that they do.

SOCRATES: Then the laws will say: ‘Consider, Socrates, if we are speakingtruly that in your present attempt you are going to do us an injury. For,having brought you into the world, and nurtured and educated you, and givenyou and every other citizen a share in every good which we had to give, wefurther proclaim to any Athenian by the liberty which we allow him, that ifhe does not like us when he has become of age and has seen the ways of thecity, and made our acquaintance, he may go where he pleases and take hisgoods with him. None of us laws will forbid him or interfere with him.Anyone who does not like us and the city, and who wants to emigrate to acolony or to any other city, may go where he likes, retaining his property.But he who has experience of the manner in which we order justice andadminister the state, and still remains, has entered into an impliedcontract that he will do as we command him. And he who disobeys us is, aswe maintain, thrice wrong; first, because in disobeying us he isdisobeying his parents; secondly, because we are the authors of hiseducation; thirdly, because he has made an agreement with us that he willduly obey our commands; and he neither obeys them nor convinces us that ourcommands are unjust; and we do not rudely impose them, but give him thealternative of obeying or convincing us;—that is what we offer, and hedoes neither. These are the sort of accusations to which, as we were saying, you,Socrates, will be exposed if you accomplish your intentions; you, above allother Athenians.’

Suppose now I ask, why I rather than anybody else? theywill justly retort upon me that I above all other men have acknowledged theagreement. ‘There is clear proof,’ they will say, ‘Socrates, that we andthe city were not displeasing to you. Of all Athenians you have been themost constant resident in the city, which, as you never leave, you may besupposed to love. ⁷For you never went out of the cityeither to see the games, except once when you went to the Isthmus, or toany other place unless when you were on military service; nor did youtravel as other men do. Nor had you any curiosity to know other states ortheir laws: your affections did not go beyond us and our state; we wereyour especial favourites, and you acquiesced in our government of you; andhere in this city you begat your children, which is a proof of yoursatisfaction. Moreover, you might in the course of the trial, if you hadliked, have fixed the penalty at banishment; the state which refuses to letyou go now would have let you go then. But you pretended that youpreferred death to exile, ⁸and that you were not unwillingto die. And now you have forgotten these fine sentiments, and pay norespect to us the laws, of whom you are the destroyer; and are doing whatonly a miserable slave would do, running away and turning your back uponthe compacts and agreements which you made as a citizen. And first of allanswer this very question: Are we right in saying that you agreed to begoverned according to us in deed, and not in word only? Is that true ornot?’ How shall we answer, Crito? Must we not assent?

CRITO: We cannot help it, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Then will they not say: ‘You, Socrates, are breaking thecovenants and agreements which you made with us at your leisure, not in anyhaste or under any compulsion or deception, but after you have had seventyyears to think of them, during which time you were at liberty to leave thecity, if we were not to your mind, or if our covenants appeared to you tobe unfair. You had your choice, and might have gone either to Lacedaemonor Crete, both which states are often praised by you for their goodgovernment, or to some other Hellenic or foreign state. Whereas you, aboveall other Athenians, seemed to be so fond of the state, or, in other words,of us, her laws (and who would care about a state which has no laws?), thatyou never stirred out of her; the halt, the blind, the maimed were notmore stationary in her than you were. And now you run away and forsakeyour agreements. Not so, Socrates, if you will take our advice; do notmake yourself ridiculous by escaping out of the city.

‘For just consider, if you transgress and err in this sort of way, whatgood will you do either to yourself or to your friends? That your friendswill be driven into exile and deprived of citizenship, or will lose theirproperty, is tolerably certain; and you yourself, if you fly to one of theneighbouring cities, as, for example, Thebes or Megara, both of which arewell governed, will come to them as an enemy, Socrates, and theirgovernment will be against you, and all patriotic citizens will cast anevil eye upon you as a subverter of the laws, and you will confirm in theminds of the judges the justice of their own condemnation of you. For hewho is a corrupter of the laws is more than likely to be a corrupter of theyoung and foolish portion of mankind. Will you then flee from well-orderedcities and virtuous men? and is existence worth having on these terms? Orwill you go to them without shame, and talk to them, Socrates? And whatwill you say to them? What you say here about virtue and justice andinstitutions and laws being the best things among men? Would that bedecent of you? Surely not. But if you go away from well-governed statesto Crito’s friends in Thessaly, where there is great disorder and licence,they will be charmed to hear the tale of your escape from prison, set offwith ludicrous particulars of the manner in which you were wrapped in agoatskin or some other disguise, and metamorphosed as the manner is ofrunaways; but will there be no one to remind you that in your old age youwere not ashamed to violate the most sacred laws from a miserable desire ofa little more life? Perhaps not, if you keep them in a good temper; but ifthey are out of temper you will hear many degrading things; you will live,but how?—as the flatterer of all men, and the servant of all men; anddoing what?—eating and drinking in Thessaly, having gone abroad in orderthat you may get a dinner. And where will be your fine sentiments aboutjustice and virtue? Say that you wish to live for the sake of yourchildren—you want to bring them up and educate them—will you take theminto Thessaly and deprive them of Athenian citizenship? Is this thebenefit which you will confer upon them? Or are you under the impressionthat they will be better cared for and educated here if you are stillalive, although absent from them; for your friends will take care of them?Do you fancy that if you are an inhabitant of Thessaly they will take careof them, and if you are an inhabitant of the other world that they will nottake care of them? Nay; but if they who call themselves friends are goodfor anything, they will—to be sure they will.

‘Listen, then, Socrates, to us who have brought you up. Think not of lifeand children first, and of justice afterwards, but of justice first, thatyou may be justified before the princes of the world below. For neitherwill you nor any that belong to you be happier or holier or juster in thislife, or happier in another, if you do as Crito bids. Now you depart ininnocence, a sufferer and not a doer of evil; a victim, not of the laws,but of men. But if you go forth, returning evil for evil, and injury forinjury, breaking the covenants and agreements which you have made with us,and wronging those whom you ought least of all to wrong, that is to say,yourself, your friends, your country, and us, we shall be angry with youwhile you live, and our brethren, the laws in the world below, will receiveyou as an enemy; for they will know that you have done your best to destroyus. Listen, then, to us and not to Crito.’

This, dear Crito, is the voice which I seem to hear murmuring in my ears,like the sound of the flute in the ears of the mystic; that voice, I say,is humming in my ears, and prevents me from hearing any other. And I knowthat anything more which you may say will be vain. Yet speak, if you haveanything to say.

CRITO: I have nothing to say, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Leave me then, Crito, to fulfil the will of God, and to followwhither he leads.

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